

Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

IV. — *Conditional Sentences in Aischylos.*

By EDWARD B. CLAPP,

PROFESSOR IN ILLINOIS COLLEGE, JACKSONVILLE, ILL.

THE object of this paper is a simple one. It is not proposed to theorize upon hypothetical expression in general, or even to advocate special views of the structure of the Greek condition; but merely to give an accurate account of the actual usage of the poet whose writings form the subject-matter of the discussion. It is hoped that the facts collected may be of use in swelling the total of evidence which shall finally settle some of the difficult grammatical questions which are not yet satisfactorily decided.

Professor Goodwin has truly said: "He who imagines that every important principle of Greek and Latin syntax is as well understood and as clearly defined as the rules for addition and multiplication in Arithmetic has not yet begun to learn." In the minute examination of Greek usage which alone can finally establish these principles upon a solid basis, there are few writers of more importance than Aischylos. He wrote in an age when the Attic dialect had not yet crystallized into all the regularity of form which it reached under the influence of his successors. His style resembles that of Pindar in exhibiting, though in a lesser degree, certain transitional forms, and traces of Homeric usage, which disappear still more completely in the Greek of Sophokles and Euripides. It should be stated, however, at the outset, that the usage of Aischylos will be found to conform, with reasonable closeness, to the rules of Attic syntax, as laid down in the standard treatises. As a basis for the discussion the writer has examined all the conditional sentences which are found in the extant plays, as well as those in the fragments included in the Paris edition (Ahrens) of 1877. The text of the plays followed is that of Paley's fourth London edition (1879) unless otherwise stated. The fragments are quoted as numbered in the Paris edition.

As hinted above, Aischylos occupies a middle ground, in the structure of his conditional sentences, between the wealth of variety exhibited by the Homeric poems, and the more sharply defined forms of the later Attic writers; though he stands naturally in much closer connection with the latter class. No scheme of division yet proposed can be made to embrace all the varieties of his usage, but it will be convenient to assume, as a starting-point, the four classes recognized by Professor Gildersleeve,[1] designated respectively by the terms "Logical," "Anticipatory," "Ideal," and "Unreal," as well as the two special forms for expressing a generic supposition, according as the conclusion represents indefinite frequency in present, or in past, time. But besides these sentences with a regular protasis introduced by a word meaning *if*, it has seemed necessary to include in our observation those relative sentences in which the relative pronoun or adverb refers to an indefinite antecedent, since it is agreed that these show the same general structure as pure conditionals. It has also been thought best to add a brief notice of those participles which are plainly conditional in force, as well as an enumeration of the cases of the so-called "potential" optative and "potential" indicative.

I.

A "logical" condition may refer to either past, present, or future time, and is expressed by εἰ with the indicative mood. It conveys no idea of probability or improbability, but merely states that the given conclusion necessarily follows upon the given condition. This form deals with facts rather than with theories or possibilities, so much so that εἰ sometimes seems to lose its conditional force altogether, and to be nearly equivalent to *since*. This use is too familiar to need illustration, and is not uncommon in Aischylos. Its pointed directness of meaning makes it peculiarly appropriate for use in argument, whence this form has derived its name of "logical."

[1] Studies in Pindaric Syntax, p. 1. (Am. J. Phil., Vol. III., No. 12.)

Logical conditions are comparatively very numerous in Aischylos, more than 60 per cent of all his pure conditional sentences belonging to this class. Comparing Aischylos with other writers on this point, we find that in Pindar, according to Professor Gildersleeve, the proportion of logical conditions is still greater, amounting to almost 66 per cent. In more than 100 consecutive conditions counted by the writer in the Odyssey, only 41 per cent were logical; while a similar experiment with Sophokles gave a result of 54 per cent, or decidedly less than in Aischylos. We thus see that Aischylos, in this feature of his style, stands much nearer to the matter-of-fact directness of Pindar than to the ease and exuberance of the Homeric diction. Of these logical conditions, 96 in number, 59 have the verb of the protasis in the present tense. The present tense is also by far the most frequent in the apodosis. The imperative, and the optative with ἄν, occur frequently in the apodosis, but by no means so often as the present indicative.

The use of the future requires special notice. In 24 of the logical protases, or 25 per cent of the whole, the verb is in the future indicative, and the question naturally arises how these conditions differ in meaning from the anticipatory form expressed by ἐάν with the subjunctive. It has been suggested that the difference between the present or aorist subjunctive, in protasis, on the one hand, and the future indicative, on the other hand, must lie in the fact that the latter disregards the distinction between continuous and momentary action which the subjunctive mood allows. From this fact there is deduced the following answer to the question raised above: "The neglect of this distinction, in εἰ with the future indicative, shows a certain coldness, a certain indifference; and this, added to the general rigor of the logical condition, which faces fact in all its grimness, gives a stern, minatory, prophetic tone to the future indicative, which commentators and grammarians have noticed, but noticed only in passing, and noticed without attempting to account for it."[1] It will be

[1] "On εἰ with the future indicative and ἐάν with the subjunctive." (Trans. Am. Phil. Assoc., Vol. VII, 1876, p. 9.)

interesting to examine the cases in which Aischylos uses the logical future, and notice how far the theory just stated is supported by the facts discovered. The writer quoted leaves the fragments out of view altogether, and also does not mention the case, Sept. 98, where a future verb is plainly to be supplied, though a similar case, Sup. 505, is included in his list. This reduces the number of logical futures in his enumeration to 22. Of these, 11 (Sup. 455, 466, 468, 880, 901, Pr. 320, Per. 371, Sept. 183, Ag. 1026, Cho. 562, Eum. 567) are described as minatory in tone. But in several of the cases this meaning is not plainly apparent to the present writer. For example, in Sup. 468 ff. the king says to the Danaids, who ask his protection,

> εἰ δ' αὖθ' ὁμαίμοις παισὶν Αἰγύπτου σέθεν
> σταθεὶς πρὸ τειχέων διὰ μάχης ᾖξω τέλους,
> πῶς οὐχὶ τἀνάλωμα γίγνεται πικρόν;

In these words he is far from threatening the suppliants. He is merely appealing to their reason to consider the consequences, to himself and his country, if he takes up arms in their behalf. So in Cho. 562, Sup. 901, the threatening idea is by no means prominent (contrast Sup. 880, where it is unmistakable), while even in Ag. 1026, Eum. 567, it is no more prominent than in several cases where ἐὰν and the subjunctive mood are used, *e.g.* Sup. 606, Pr. 1035, Ag. 1397. This reduces the number of cases which are plainly and strongly minatory to six. Of the 13 remaining logical futures Per. 359 is a warning, and Frag. 283 appears to be a threat, so far as can be ascertained in the absence of a fuller context. In eight cases (Sept. 98, 614, Ag. 200, 1220, 1309, Cho. 174, 265, Eum. 469) the future expresses merely present intention, probability, or necessity. In the other five cases (Sup. 468, 505, Cho. 562, 670, 762), we have nothing but simple future conditions such as could apparently be equally well expressed by ἐὰν and the subjunctive.

To recapitulate briefly, six cases are plainly minatory, five cases are more or less tinged with the same idea, and 13 cases do not show a trace of it. So far as the usage of Aischylos

is concerned, then, we cannot advance much beyond the rule of Professor Goodwin,[1] who considers the future indicative with εἰ as only a way of expressing "more vividly" precisely the same idea conveyed by ἐὰν with the subjunctive; except in cases where the former may be translated *is to* or *must*. It should be stated, however, that the writer quoted above admits that the induction is not so wide as could be desired, in the case of Aischylos; and also clearly recognizes the meaning *is to* as a common one in these cases. On the other hand, it need not be disputed that the greater vagueness of the future indicative, in point of duration, may make it peculiarly appropriate for solemn warning and threat. We will only add, if an Homeric instance may be cited, that in the familiar passage, A 135 ff., the first, or favorable, alternative is expressed by εἰ with the future indicative, εἰ δώσουσι, while the second alternative, accompanied by the threat, is εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώωσιν, or precisely contrary to what we should expect. But we are at present concerned only with what can be learned from the usage of Aischylos.

The logical condition in Aischylos almost always refers to a particular occurrence, only two cases, Ag. 1299 (?) and Cho. 743, being plainly generic.

We subjoin a list of logical conditions, arranged according to the tense of the protasis: —

1. Protasis εἰ with pres. ind. — Sup. 56, 72, 182, 361, 381, 758, 937 (to be supplied), Pr. 204, 351, 353, 625, 701, 782, 784 (to be supplied), 835 (to be supplied), 838, 854, 999 (to be supplied), 1009, Per. 297, 633, 796, 799, Sept. 442, Ag. 155, 161, 329, 654, 659, 816, 917, 1017, 1027, 1055, 1210, 1267, 1279 (to be supplied), 1299 (text doubtful; see anticipatory conditions), 1311, 1374, 1639, Cho. 97, 195, 215 (to be supplied), 290 (2 perf. = pres.), 490, 513, 561, 643, 655, 659, 743, Eum. 31 (to be supplied), 210, 282, 417, 448, 845, 847. (59)

2. Protasis εἰ with fut. ind. — Sup. 455, 466, 468, 505 (to be supplied), 880, 901, Pr. 320, Per. 359, 371 (opt. by ind. disc.), Sept. 98 (to be supplied), 183, 614, Ag. 200, 1026, 1220, 1309, Cho. 174, 265, 562, 670, 762, Eum. 469, 567, Frag. 283. (24)

[1] Moods and Tenses, pp. 93, 103.

3. Protasis εἰ with perf. ind. — Sup. 993, Pr. 840, Per. 160, Ag. 29. (4)
4. Protasis εἰ with imp. ind. — Sup. 338, Ag. 839, Cho. 534. (3)
5. Protasis εἰ with aor. ind. — Per. 219, Ag. 503 (to be supplied), 907 (to be supplied), 1108 (to be supplied), Eum. 259. (5)
6. Protasis εἰ with plup. ind. — Cho. 190. (1)

II.

Professor Gildersleeve, following Bäumlein,[1] divides the "anticipatory" conditionals into particular and general. In the present discussion, however, the generic conditions will be considered as a class by themselves, as the different forms of their apodoses would certainly justify us in doing. In the anticipatory condition the protasis is in the subjunctive mood, usually with ἐάν, but sometimes, as we shall see, with εἰ. The apodosis may be of a variety of forms, all of which are future in meaning. The most common of these are the future indicative and the imperative. The only idea which can be said to be invariably expressed by this form is that of futurity. This class of conditions is by no means of frequent occurrence in Aischylos, including only nine per cent of the total number. With these cases, 15 in number, may conveniently be classed the three instances (Sup. 144, Cho. 297, 475) of εἰ δὲ μή in protasis, with verb omitted, as the apodosis in each of these cases is a future. The present subjunctive occurs with about the same frequency as the aorist, in protasis, while in apodosis the future indicative outnumbers all other forms together. It is worth noticing that the same severe and threatening tone which has been referred to as ascribed to the future indicative, in protasis, may be detected in many of these cases also. In Sup. 606, Pr. 685, 1035, Sept. 1030, Ag. 1397, and in all the cases of εἰ δὲ μή, it is plainly discernible. These five cases may be taken as an additional evidence that it would not be safe, so far as Aischylos is concerned, to regard that tone as belonging especially to the logical future. The cases of εἰ δὲ μή do not bear upon this point in either

[1] Untersuchungen über die griechische Modi, p. 208.

direction, as the verb of the protasis is not expressed at all; these words, as is often remarked, having developed into a mere formula for the alternative, until the writer who used them became unconscious what verb should be supplied. Its apodosis is in Aischylos always the future indicative.

Side by side with the 10 cases of what may be called the regular form of the anticipatory condition we find five other cases (Sup. 86, 394, Per. 787, Ag. 1299, Eum. 225) where the verb is still in the subjunctive, but where the conjunction which introduces it is a simple *εἰ* in place of *ἐάν*. This is so rare a construction in Attic Greek as to call for special attention. On these five cases alone it would be difficult to build any safe theory regarding the intention which our poet may have had in the use of this form of protasis. But there are also several instances (Sup. 116, Sept. 328, 816, Ag. 740, Eum. 202, 322, 631) of the analogous use of a relative pronoun or adverb without *ἄν* introducing the subjunctive; and by combining these two classes in our observation it may be possible to approach a generalization. It is well known that this use of *εἰ* with the subjunctive is of very ancient date in Greek literature, and that it gradually disappeared in the later writers. In the Homeric poems the subjunctive is introduced by *εἰ* much oftener than by *εἰ κεν* or *εἰ ἄν*, and it is important to remember that the former is invariably preferred in general conditions.[1] Pindar uses only *εἰ* with the conditional subjunctive, and always in the generic sense.[2] The construction is also occasionally found in Sophokles, where the generic signification seems to be less common. In O. K. 1442, for example, the meaning is specific, but in O. T. 1230 it is generic. In Attic prose this construction is exceedingly rare. If now we examine carefully each case occurring in Aischylos, we find that in nine (Sup. 86, 116, Sept. 328, Ag. 740, 1299, Eum. 202, 225, 320, 631) the condition is certainly generic, while in two of the other three (Sup. 394, Pers. 786), the generic idea is by no means out of the question, but can easily be conceived of as present in the poet's mind. We

[1] Seymour, Introd. to Lang. and Verse of Homer, p. 25.

[2] Gildersleeve, Studies in Pindaric Syntax, p. 8. (Am. J. Phil., Vol. III., No. 12.)

may conclude, then, with reasonable certainty, that when Aischylos used εἰ with the subjunctive, or a relative word without ἄν with the same mood, he was under the influence of Homeric usage, and felt that this construction was peculiarly appropriate to the expression of a generic, in distinction from a particular, condition.

The list of anticipatory conditions is as follows: —

1. Protasis ἐάν with pres. subj. — Pr. 334, 685 (changed to εἰ with opt. by ind. disc.), Sept. 1030, Ag. 1397, 1645, Sup. 606. (6)
2. Protasis ἐάν with aor. subj. — Pr. 1035, Per. 531, Sept. 231, Cho. 984 (text doubtful). (4)
3. Protasis εἰ with pres. subj. — Per. 787, Ag. 1299 (text doubtful). (2)
4. Protasis εἰ with aor. subj. — Sup. 86, 394, Eum. 225. (3)
5. εἰ δὲ μή — Sup. 144, Cho. 297, 475. (3)

III.

The "ideal" condition is expressed by εἰ with the optative. Its apodosis may be of a variety of forms, but the favorite conclusion, both in Aischylos and in the other Attic writers is the optative with ἄν. Aischylos uses ideal conditions with considerable frequency, the cases numbering 30, or 19 per cent of his pure conditional sentences. Of these, 16 show the present optative. The ordinary form of the apodosis occurs 19 times. As is well known there is a difference of opinion among grammarians as to the exact relation in meaning between this form of sentence and the anticipatory subjunctive with ἐάν. Both kinds of condition refer to future time, and Professor Goodwin argues that the only difference between them is that the subjunctive brings the contingency "more vividly" before the mind than the optative, and that, beyond this, they could be used interchangeably. This view was opposed by many scholars, among others by the late Professor Morris,[1] who held to the view that the optative implies a less degree of probability than the subjunctive. It has been felt that the optative is the "condition of fancy,"

[1] Trans. Am. Phil. Assoc., Vol. VI., 1875.

that "there is often an element of wish, for or against, of hope or fear," even by those who admit that the difference in respect to probability and practicability is more or less foreign. Examining the usage of Aischylos on this point, we notice to begin with that he never uses the anticipatory condition to express an impossibility, or even a striking improbability. Every case of the subjunctive with ἐάν points to a possibility which is by no means unlikely to be realized. After mentioning this, by way of preface, let us examine the significance of the ideal conditions somewhat more minutely. We find that in 10 cases (Sup. 734, Per. 236, 528, Sept. 4, 389, 545, Ag. 37, 338, 903, 1637), there is a strongly implied wish that the condition may be fulfilled. In six cases, on the other hand (Sup. 680, 710, Pr. 1000, Sept. 5, Ag. 336, 756), the wish is just as plainly opposed to the fulfilment. We have then 16 cases, or about one-half of the whole, in which the idea is conspicuous of a fulfilment being either desired or dreaded. We may add that Sup. 902 is strongly threatening in tone. If now we attempt a rough classification of the 13 remaining cases, we find that in three the realization may be regarded as probable, in two as improbable, while in the rest no leaning in either direction can be detected. In short, the attempt to develop a rule for the signification of this form of condition, from the usage of Aischylos, may be said to end in failure. We can find safe ground only by retiring to our former position, and resting content with the assertion that the ideal condition in Aischylos is future in time, and conveys no assumption either for or against its realization. As far as our author, at least, is concerned, we must follow the conservative statement of Krüger,[1] that in this form "der redende will über die bedingung und ihre folge seine subjective ungewissheit ausdrücken." It should, perhaps, be added that the statement above does not include those cases of the optative with εἰ which express indefinite frequency in past time. The few examples of this kind are noticed below, when the general conditions are touched upon.

[1] Griechische Sprachlehre, 54. 11.

The list of ideal conditions is as follows: —

1. Protasis εἰ with pres. opt. — Sup. 710, 734, Pr. 449 (to be supplied), 1000, Per. 431, 528, 786, Sept. 680, Ag. 538, 546, 903, 1009, 1016, 1365, Eum. 398, Frag. 338. (16)

2. Prot. εἰ with aor. opt. — Sup. 902, 918, Per. 236 (to be supplied), Sept. 4, 5, 398 (*bis*), 545, Ag. 37, 336, 338, 856, 1637, Eum. 445 (ind. disc.). (14)

IV.

The "unreal" condition is expressed by εἰ with a secondary tense of the indicative. Its conclusion is commonly in one of the same tenses with ἄν. It carries with it the assumption that the condition is, or was, unfulfilled. This is a rare form in Aischylos, only 11 cases being found in his extant works. In seven cases the protasis is in the imperfect tense, in three in the aorist, and in one in the pluperfect. Of the protases in the imperfect tense the opposing reality is present in the case of three, while in the four remaining it is an enduring or repeated fact in the past. In the case of the four aorist protases it is always a past reality which is suggested; while in Ag. 842, the only pluperfect protasis, εἰ δ' ἦν τεθνηκώς, it is the completed perfect τέθνηκε. In Sup. 241 we have an example of the omission of ἄν in an apodosis of this form. This usage is a common one in most of the Attic writers and requires no special remark. In Ag. 908,

τί δ' ἄν δοκεῖ σοι Πρίαμος εἰ τάδ' ἤνυσεν,

the apodosis is not fully expressed, but we may supply without hesitation the infinitive δρᾶσαι ἄν. We leave this form of condition without further comment, as the few cases which can be recorded prevent no questions of special interest or difficulty.

The list is as follows: —

1. Protasis εἰ with imp. ind. — Sup. 241, 284, Sept. 659, Ag. 839, 993, 1172, 1366. (7)

2. Protasis εἰ with aor ind. — Sept. 1019, Ag. 908, 909 (supplied from preceding). (3)

3. Protasis εἰ with plup. ind. — Ag. 842. (1)

V.

Of the pure conditional sentences in Aischylos only seven are certainly generic. A condition may be said to be certainly generic when it plainly refers to any one of a class, or series, of possibilities, and when its apodosis is in one of the tenses of repeated action. In the ordinary Attic of Xenophon and Plato the protasis of a present general condition is expressed by the subjunctive with ἐάν, the past general protasis by the optative with εἰ. But it is soon perceived, on an inspection of the general conditions of Aischylos, that he uses the simple εἰ more frequently than ἐάν, even in present general conditions. These three cases (Sup. 86, Ag. 1299, Eum. 225) of εἰ with the subjunctive have already been discussed under the anticipatory subjunctive. In Ag. 1299 the text is doubtful, but the analogy of the other cases, as well as its close resemblance to the Ms. reading, leads us to prefer the subjunctive. The one certain case of a generic condition expressed by the indicative, Cho. 743, was included also in the list of logical conditions. The two cases of ἐὰν (ἢν) with the subjunctive are perfectly clear, and need no discussion, and the same may be said of the single example of the optative, Pr. 486. It should be added, in view of the small number of generic conditions quoted, that Aischylos is much fonder of the hypothetical relative sentence, in expressing general ideas, than of the pure conditional form, as will appear when the relative conditionals are discussed.

The list is as follows: —

1. Protasis ἐὰν with subj. — Pr. 387, Per. 704. (2)
2. Protasis εἰ with opt. — Pr. 486. (1)
3. Protasis εἰ with subj. — Sup. 86, Ag. 1299 (text doubtful), Eum. 225. (3)
4. Protasis εἰ with indic. — Cho. 743. (1)

We have now finished our survey of the pure conditional sentences in Aischylos. It remains for us only to glance at

two or three other forms of hypothetical expression, more or less closely connected, in form as in thought, with those which have already been spoken of.

VI.

We notice first the hypothetical relative sentences. In these the relative word, be it pronoun or adverb, refers to an indefinite antecedent, and this gives the sentence the contingent character of a condition. In their different forms these sentences correspond closely to most of the different kinds of protasis which have been enumerated above, though in Aischylos the anticipatory and generic far outnumber the other varieties. The anticipatory relative sentence is very frequent, no less than 34 cases being found. The generic relative conditions are next in frequency, numbering 24. Besides these there is one case (Sup. 1031) of the logical form; while the other forms are entirely unrepresented in our poet. Very few of these require any special comment. The seven cases of a relative without *ἄν*, introducing the subjunctive, have been discussed above, under the head of anticipatory conditions, where it was seen that Aischylos uses this mode of expression somewhat freely, and with a strong tendency toward the generic meaning. In Per. 452,

> *ὅπως ὅταν νεῶν*
> *φθαρέντες ἐχθροὶ νῆσον ἐκσωζοίατο,*

we have one of the rare cases of *ἂν* with a relative retained when the verb is changed from the subjunctive to the optative by the principles of indirect discourse. Although this phenomenon is not altogether unknown in other writers, and is even found in Attic prose (Paley cites Soph. Trach. 164, 687, and Dem. Mid. 518. 11), yet it is so rare that Elmsley and Dindorf, and some others, adopt the desperate expedient of reading, for *ὅταν νεῶν, ὅτ' ἐκ νεῶν.* This seems to be a violent measure for preserving grammatical regularity, as there is no reasonable ground for doubting the authenticity of the text. Professor Gildersleeve acutely suggests that

εἰ with the subjunctive was the normal form for the generic condition, and that this explains the apparent anomaly of the dropping of ἄν in the change from direct to indirect discourse. He adds,[1] "The occasional emergence of ἐάν, ὅταν, and the like, with the optative, may be due in part to a rebellion against a misunderstood tradition." The meaning of the passage, at any rate, is clear. In Ag. 360 ff. ἄν is dropped according to the general rule.

We add the usual list: —

a. Logical.

1. Protasis relative with ind. — Sup. 1031. (1)

b. Anticipatory.

2. Protasis relative and ἄν with subj. — Sup. 429, Pr. 172, 182, 197, 266, 384, 716, 738, 775, 809, 811, 829, 1012, 1048, Per. 176, 232, 366, Sept. 697, 732, 733, Ag. 947, 1289, 1318, 1410, Cho. 730, 811, 953, Eum. 324, 428, 526, Frag. 323, 341. (32)

3. Protasis relative with subj. — Sept. 816. (1)

4. Protasis relative and ἄν with opt. — Per. 452 (changed from subj. by ind. disc. (1)

c. General.

5. Protasis relative and ἄν with subj. — Pr. 35, 601, 603, 738, Ag. 7, 12, 16, 621, 943, Cho. 407, 767, Eum. 33, 335, 617. (14)

6. Protasis relative with subj. — Sup. 116, Sept. 328, Ag. 740, Eum. 202, 322, 631. (6)

7. Protasis relative with opt. — Ag. 363 (changed from subj. by ind. disc.), 549, Eum. 588, 696. (4)

VII.

Conditional participles are frequent in Aischylos, the present and aorist appearing in about equal numbers. This use of the participle is too familiar to need illustration, though it is, of course, often difficult to decide, in case of a given participle, whether it has a conditional force or not. Drawing the line as carefully as possible we find in Aischylos 44 conditional participles, of which 24 are present and 20 are aorist. The optative with ἄν is by far the most frequent form of

[1] Studies in Pindaric Syntax, p. 9. (Am. J. Phil., Vol. III., No. 12.)

apodosis, occurring oftener than all the others together. As the normal protasis for such an apodosis is the optative with εἰ, we may say that Aischylos, in his use of the conditional participle, prefers to make it equivalent to an ideal condition. Although a thorough examination has not been made, it is believed that the same statement is true of Xenophon and Plato. It will be noticed that this fact is in perfect accord with what we should expect. The difference in meaning between a protasis expressed by a participle and the formal condition with εἰ or ἐάν is that the former merely suggests the hypothetical character of the statement, while the latter states it distinctly. It is the greater vagueness of the participle as a protasis which makes the ideal form of apodosis most natural in connection with it.

The conditional participles noted are as follows: —

1. Present participles. — Sup. 207, 223, 399, 582, Pr. 330, 502, 512, 1006, Sept. 182, 557, 668, 716, Ag. 939, 1203, Cho. 332, 410, Eum. 497, 520, 648, 670, 742, 946, Frag. 177, 338. (24)

2. Aorist participles. — Sup. 151, 222, 285, 480, Pr. 777, 789, Per. 214, 215, 216, Sept. 598, Ag. 264, 526, 937, Cho. 250, 308, 511, Eum. 447, 455, 689, Frag. 338. (20)

VIII.

We notice, finally, the very familiar construction known as the "potential optative." According to the common theory, its history is easy to trace. Originally it was merely an apodosis of an ideal condition, with an omitted protasis easy to supply. An example in Per. 235 f. This case is not yet a potential optative, but merely an incomplete conditional sentence. But from such a sentence the transition is easy to one in which the protasis is general, indefinite, or vague; and finally to that in which the conditional idea almost disappears, and the optative practically becomes a way of expressing a tempered and modified futurity. A case of the vague protasis is Sup. 277; while in Sup. 392 f. the optative is only a softened future. A still farther development of this form of expression is seen in such cases as Sup. 75 f.

ὕβριν δ' ἑτοίμως στυγόντες
πέλοιτ' ἂν ἔνδικοι γάμοις,

'Promptly loathing outrage, be just to our marriage,' where the optative expresses a prayer, or mild command. This use of the potential optative, which is frequent in Aischylos (there are 14 cases of it), may be explained by an ellipsis of such a phrase as "if you act justly," or a similar expression. Including all the different uses, we find 125 cases of the potential optative in Aischylos. This embraces all optatives with *ἂν* (and a few, to be noticed below, where *ἂν* is omitted), for which no protasis is expressed, or can be directly supplied from the context. The cases in which such an implied protasis exists are classed as incomplete ideal conditions. Of these 125, 74 are aorist and 51 are present. The number of cases where *ἂν* is omitted is eight (Pr. 300, Ag. 535, 603, 1016, 1133, 1347, Cho. 164, 585). Three of these (Pr. 300, Ag. 603, Cho. 164) occur after a negative expression such as *οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ* (Pr. 300), a construction which is sufficiently common to be noticed by the makers of our grammars. In Ag. 1347 and Cho. 585, the optative occurs in questions which are nearly equivalent to negative assertions. In the three remaining cases there is no such negative idea, or question; so that the dictum of Professor Goodwin,[1] that in the Attic poets this usage occurs "chiefly in questions, and after such expressions as *οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως*," is fairly in harmony with what we can learn of the practice of Aischylos. Here, as in other cases, we find that forms of expression are not so thoroughly matured and differentiated in the style of Aischylos as in that of Sophokles and the contemporary Attic writers.

With the potential optative we may conveniently group the 10 so-called "potential" indicatives. This is a construction which bears the same relation to the unreal conditional sentence as the potential optative to the ideal condition. It is an unreal condition with its protasis omitted, which can, however, usually be inferred with more or less certainty

[1] Moods and Tenses, p. 106.

from the context, *e.g.* Cho. 696, Pr. 773. These cases need no farther comment.

We close with the list of potential optatives and indicatives.

a. Ordinary potential optatives.

1. Present. — Sup. 181, 204, 331, 362, 503, 585, 636, 764, 767, 905, 1039, 1040, Pr. 771, 935, 954, Per. 245, 785, Sept. 370, 467, 564, 701, Ag. 254, 310, 314, 717, 811, 869, 906 (changed to inf. by ind. disc.), 1016 (without ἄν), 1556, 1643, Cho. 475, 509, 585 (without ἄν), 982 (changed to inf. by ind. disc.), 991, Eum. 219, 412, Frag. 295. (39)

2. Aorist. — Sup. 20, 211, 277, 323, 393, 438, 442, 707, 751, Pr. 63, 404, 511, 526, 528, 635, 925, 927, 955, 988, Per. 267, 440, 702, 782, Sept. 392, 397, 464, 515, 704, 904, 1069, Ag. 243, 266, 271, 535 (without ἄν), 605, 989, 1099, 1133 (without ἄν), 1170, 1299, 1347 (without ἄν), 1425, 1485, 1542, Cho. 254, 386, 401, 456, 557, 695, 764, 783, 827, 832, 839, 987, 988, 1039, 1051, Eum. 203, 274, 290, 407, 490, 554, 615, 633, 636, 819. (69)

b. Potential optatives expressing mild command.

3. Present. — Sup. 76, 318, 450, 494, Sept. 250, 710, Cho. 100, 159, 504, Eum. 94, 117, 651. (12)

4. Aorist. — Pr. 634, Eum. 980. (2)

c. Optative after negative expressions.

5. Pr. 300, Ag. 603, Cho. 164. (3)

d. Potential indicatives.

6. Sup. 581, Pr. 252, 773, 1004, Per. 340 (changed to inf. by ind. disc.), Ag. 906, 992, 1223, Cho. 688, 696. (10)